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ABSTRACT
This Article performs a close analysis of workers’ compensation
coverage of COVID-19 and arrives at the conclusion that it should not be
“impossible” to prove in a legal sense that an employee’s COVID-19 was
caused by work. Scientific proof is not the same as legal proof: Workers’
compensation law has never required that claims must be supported by
irrefutable scientific proof of workplace causation. Yet repeatedly one
heard this suggestion during public discussion on workers’ compensation
coverage of employees.
Still, there is good evidence that even when workers’ compensation
undisputedly covers work-related disease, employers seldom pay benefits
and states do not compel them to do so. This is one reality that COVID-19
laid bare: The workers’ compensation system rigidly resists paying
occupational disease claims. This Article also explores a news account
from Minnesota stating that 935 of 935 workers’ compensation
COVID-19-related claims from meatpacking employees had not been
paid as of February 2021. There was no shortage of other stories
during the pandemic of mass denial of workers’ compensation claims in
the meatpacking industry, a development having a disparate impact on
communities of color, where more than half of all meatpacking employees
are Latinx. These unpaid claim numbers suggest that something was
“wrong” with causation analyses at the lower levels of the administrative
system.
Another truth COVID-19 laid bare is that, aside from workers’
compensation, there is no nationwide short-term disability program in
the United States. This leads to the conclusion that, if workers’
compensation insists upon super-strict versions of causation to cover
claims, a different method of compensating short-term disability during
pandemics or other “environmental” crises may become necessary.
The conclusion seems almost inescapable because public health experts
like Dr. Anthony Fauci are warning that we remain at risk for “new
disease emergences” for the “foreseeable future.”1

1. Rob Stein, Fauci Warns Dangerous Delta Variant Is the Greatest Threat to U.S.
COVID Efforts, NPR (June 22, 2021, 4:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2021/06/22/1008859705/delta-variant-coronavirus-unvaccinated-u-s-COVID-surge
[https://perma.cc/NCR8-3UPQ].
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the COVID-19 crisis, many observers expected workers’
compensation2 to broadly cover workers who became sick with the virus.3
Not only did this not occur, some employers appeared presumptively to
deny COVID-related workers’ compensation claims,4 perhaps applying a
heightened, but unarticulated, standard of causation that workers’
compensation does not demand.5 News stories of mass denials of claims,
including an especially notorious situation in Minnesota,6 heightened the
suspicion that something like this was going on. 7 The Minnesota story
reported that, as of February 2021, all 935 COVID-related workers’
compensation claims filed by Minnesota meatpacking workers during the
pandemic had been denied. 8 This is a shocking statistic because the
workers had been employed in crowded working conditions likely to have
increased the risk of becoming infected with COVID-19,9 a factor normally
2. Workers’ compensation is a century old state-based benefits system that pays
cash to workers injured at work in an amount that is customarily set at about two-thirds of
the pre-injury wage and capped at no more than the state average wage. S COTT D.
SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44580, WORKER’S COMPENSATION: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES 1, 19 (2020). Workers’ compensation also pays for injured workers’ injury-related
medical care and pays weekly cash benefits to the survivors of workers killed by work in
an amount related to the deceased worker’s wage at the time of death. See NAT’L ACAD.
SOC. INS., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS 2–7 (2020).
3. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, COVID-19 Heroes Must Jump Through Hoops
for Workers’ Comp, AP NEWS (July 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreakhealth-ap-top-news-politics-workers-compensation-3d1a65d4d69adfe464b435c86730dfdf
[https://perma.cc/5DQY-JWWJ].
4. Tom Hals & Tom Polansek, Meatpackers Deny Workers Benefits for COVID19 Deaths, Illnesses, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
health-coronavirus-jbs-colorado-idUSKBN26K334 [https://perma.cc/3C9K-7R7J].
5. See infra Parts III–IV.
6. Joe Carlson, No Workers’ Comp Paid So Far at Minnesota Meatpacking Plants,
STAR TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2021, 5:22 PM), https://www.startribune.com/no-workers-comppaid-so-far-at-minnesota-meatpacking-plants/600025831/ [https://perma.cc/6RGG-K67A].
A Reuters story that may have been referencing the same statistics—though it is unclear—
reported that “[i]n Minnesota, where JBS had a major outbreak, meatpacking employees
filed 930 workers’ compensation claims involving COVID-19 as of Sept. 11, according to
the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. None were accepted, 717 were rejected
and 213 were under review. The agency did not identify the employers.” Hals & Polansek,
supra note 4.
7. See Hals & Polansek, supra note 4.
8. Carlson, supra note 6.
9. Michelle A. Waltenburg et al., Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat
and Poultry Processing Facilities ― United States, April–May 2020, 69 MORBIDITY &
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militating in favor of workers’ compensation coverage. 10 Furthermore,
meatpackers were not covered as “essential employees” under Minnesota’s
COVID-19 workers’ compensation causation presumption.11 According
to the article, “[f]or Minnesota jobs that had the presumption, 19% of
COVID-related workers’ compensation claims were denied, state data show.
In jobs without the presumption, 68% were denied.”12 Authorized essential
workers included medical providers, police, firefighters, corrections officers
and child care workers.13 Many employees obviously do not fit into these
classifications and, as this statistic demonstrates, were at much higher risk
of claim denial.14 The story was following up original reports of similar
rates of claim denial throughout the meatpacking industry.15 These types
of mass denials hit communities of color especially hard: “Latino workers
at meat and chicken processing plants have been the hardest hit by coronavirus,
accounting for 56 percent of cases reported in plants in 21 states, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported.”16
High rates of workers’ compensation claim denial should more generally
sound an alarm since workers’ compensation is the only benefit system in
the United States covering the lost wages of partially or short-term totally
disabled workers.17 While there are legal and historical reasons that workers’

MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 887, 887 (2020) (“Distinctive factors that increase meat and
poultry processing workers’ risk for exposure to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes
COVID-19, include prolonged close workplace contact with coworkers (within 6 feet for
≥15 minutes) for long time periods (8–12 hour shifts), shared workspaces, shared
transportation to and from the workplace, congregate housing, and frequent community
contact with fellow workers.”).
10. See infra Parts III.A–III.B.
11. See Carlson, supra note 6. Presumptions are a kind of legal procedure making
it easier to find that COVID-19 has been caused by work. See id. About seventeen states
enacted presumptions during the pandemic. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
12. See Carlson, supra note 6.
13. Id.; H.F. 4537, 2020 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2020) (“[A]n employee who
contracts COVID-19 is presumed to have an occupational disease arising out of an in the
course of employment if the employee” was a “peace officer . . . firefighter; paramedic;
nurse or health care worker, correctional officer, or security counselor employed by the
state or a political subdivision at a corrections, detention, or secure treatment facility . . . .”).
14. See Carlson, supra note 6.
15. See Chris Walker, Meatpacking Plants Deny Workers Comp to Thousands Who
Contracted COVID-19, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 29, 2020), https://truthout.org/articles/meatpackingplants-deny-workers-comp-to-thousands-who-contracted-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/
RY25-BLZU].
16. Suzanne Gamboa, Coronavirus Reported in Over Half of Latino Meat, Poultry
Workers in 21 States, CDC Says, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/latino/coronavirus-reported-over-half-latino-meat-poultry-workers-21states-n1233192?icid=related [https://perma.cc/FN8Y-YV4Z].
17. Only a handful of states provide short-term disability benefits: California, New
York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Hawaii. See CATHERINE STAMM & KATHARINE

294

DUFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 59: 291, 2022]

5/27/2022 9:21 AM

What COVID-19 Laid Bare
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

compensation does not operate as a general disability or health insurance
system,18 this Article argues that workers’ compensation doctrine could
more broadly have allowed for COVID-19 coverage if states had made
appropriate doctrinal adjustments under well-recognized and existing
rules of law. Although the early denials of claims were by employers and
insurance carriers, not states, 19 murmurings throughout the workers’
compensation community suggested uncritical acceptance of the idea that
workers would “never be able to prove” what caused their COVID-19
condition.20 However, workers’ compensation law has never demanded
irrefutable scientific proof of workplace causation, whether of diseases or
traumatic physical injuries, as a precondition of coverage.21 Employers
reflexively denying COVID-19 workers’ compensation claims on causation
grounds, or more precisely states rolling over in the face of the denials,
made a policy choice not to cover workers during the pandemic, for legal
doctrine simply did not compel such a result.22
The issue of COVID-19 coverage by workers’ compensation is one of
causation. Accordingly, this Article delves into causation, a sometimes dry,
but always important topic in both workers’ compensation and tort law.
The Article is organized in the following manner. Part II lays out
background COVID-19 context and introduces the idea of how causation

MARSHALL, MERCER L. & POL’Y GRP., 2019 STATE-MANDATED SHORT-TERM DISABILITY
CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS 1–10, 13–14 (2019).
18. See Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield & Robert W. Klein, The New
Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring
the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 406–08 (1998); Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of
Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 789 (1998)
(“[I]nsuring for general disability and health through workers’ compensation might appear
to lead to greater administrative costs than would first-party and disability insurance
purchased directly by workers.”).
19. See Lauren Weber, Why So Many Covid-19 Workers’ Comp Claims Are Being
Rejected, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2021, 10:25 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-somany-covid-19-workers-comp-claims-are-being-rejected-11613316304 [https://perma.cc/
56GJ-U92E].
20. As an example, in a recent story on an especially deadly coronavirus outbreak
at a JBS meatpacking plant in Greely, Colorado, a claimant side attorney was quoted as
saying, “That is the ultimate question: How can you prove it?” See Hals & Polansek, supra
note 4. The tone of the comment, and the story, suggested that causation “superpowers”
were required to prove that, in a workplace in which COVID-19 was spiraling out of control,
the illness of any particular employee was probably contributed to by work. See id. This
Article fundamentally rejects that view as a matter of legal doctrine. See infra Part IV.A.
21. See infra Parts III.A–III.C.
22. See infra Parts III.A–III.C.
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can create coverage problems in workers’ compensation. Fleshing out the
causation issues introduced in Part II, Part III discusses traditional workers’
compensation causation principles in greater detail. Then, in Part IV, the
Article discusses how these principles could be applied in COVID-19, or
future, pandemic contexts in a manner that is not calculated to lead to claim
denials. Part V concludes that the policy decision not to apply traditional
workers’ compensation doctrine to cover COVID-19 may lead to long term
resentment of the system—precisely at a time when new risks of workplace
injury or illness are emerging that will broadly challenge cramped readings
of workers’ compensation causation doctrine. One way or the other, workers’
compensation will have to change, whether by adaptation or transformation.
II. COVID-19 EMPLOYMENT BACKDROP
It is unsurprising that the COVID-19 pandemic had unique impacts
across American labor and employment law. Given the dire straits in
which workers found themselves in Spring 2020, it was also unsurprising
that workplace benefits systems were challenged in new ways. 23 For
example, with upwards of forty million workers losing their jobs in the
early days of the pandemic,24 it was obvious the unemployment benefits
system would suffer “shock.”25 But for those not suffering unemployment,
different kinds of challenges were presented––especially the immense
problem of becoming sick with COVID-19 while still employed. The Family
and Medical Leave Act26 may operate to hold a worker’s job in place for
a period of illness, but it does not itself provide paid sick leave or medical
benefits not already possessed by the employee.27 Federal Social Security
Disability Insurance provides qualifying workers cash benefits, and
accompanying Medicare benefits, but not until two years after initial
eligibility has been established, only when disability is “total,”28 and where
23. See generally Michael C. Duff, Causation for Workers’ Compensation, in WORK
LAW UNDER COVID-19 (Sachin S. Pandya & Jeffrey M. Hirsch eds., 2021) (ebook).
24. See Lucy Bayly, New Weekly Figures Show Almost 40 Million People Lost Their
Job Since the Pandemic, NBC NEWS (May 21, 2020, 5:31 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
business/economy/new-weekly-figures-show-almost-40-million-people-lost-their-1
211886 [https://perma.cc/4ZSL-8EJZ].
25. Andrew Soergel, More Than 33 Million Americans Have Filed for Unemployment
During Coronavirus Pandemic, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 7, 2020), https://www.usnews.
com/news/economy/articles/2020-05-07/more-than-33-million-americans-have-filed-forunemployment-during-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/SF6W-84HW].
26. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–19, 2631–36, 2651–54.
27. FMLA Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
whd/fmla/faq [https://perma.cc/S6U8-57FB].
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); Disability Benefits: How You Qualify, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability/qualify.html [https://perma.cc/N7MEERHF] (“Social Security pays for only total disability. . . . We consider you disabled under

296

DUFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 59: 291, 2022]

5/27/2022 9:21 AM

What COVID-19 Laid Bare
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

disability is expected to last longer than a year. 29 The federal Families
First Coronavirus Response Act30 helped employees by providing about
two weeks of sick leave;31 however, two weeks is not much in terms of
financial support and medical benefits were not covered.32
As the economy began to reopen, even as the coronavirus seemed to be
spiking,33 a different concern began to arise. Financially desperate workers
––especially workers of color34–– forced to return to “physical” workplaces
because their jobs could not be performed remotely, feared they might
contract COVID-19.35 As state legislatures began to pass civil liability immunity
laws, promoted by groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council,36
it became clear that even if employers negligently failed to provide safe,
virus-free workplaces, they would not be held liable for legal damages to
their sickened employees, or to their customers, for the negligence.37 But,
Social Security rules if all of the following are true: You cannot do work that you did
before the cause of your medical condition; You cannot adjust to other work because of
your medical condition; Your disability has lasted or is expected to last for at least one
year or to result in death.”).
29. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 28.
30. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 3102, 134
Stat. 189 (2020).
31. Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Employee Paid Leave Rights, U.S.
DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-employee-paid-leave [https://
perma.cc/SM38-MRGJ].
32. See id.
33. Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Coronavirus Cases Spike Across Sun Belt as
Economy Lurches into Motion, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/14/us/coronavirus-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/5EZ6-G6TR].
34. Laura Morgan Roberts et al., How U.S. Companies Can Support Employees of
Color Through the Pandemic, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 22, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/
05/how-u-s-companies-can-support-employees-of-color-through-the-pandemic [https://
perma.cc/5QQK-ZY74] (discussing the disproportionate workplace anxiety of workers of
color during the pandemic).
35. Abbott Koloff & Monsy Alvarado, ‘This is Worse than War’: Minorities HardHit by COVID Likely To Be Affected Again as NJ Reopens, NORTHJERSEY.COM (May 20,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/coronavirus/2020/05/20/njcoronavirus-hard-hit-minorities-fear-returning-to-work-as-state-reopens/5178102002/
[https://perma.cc/BYW9-U95E].
36. Don Wiener, ALEC Works to Pass Industry-Backed COVID Liability Shields at
the State Level, TRUTHOUT (Aug. 10, 2020), https://truthout.org/articles/alec-worksto-pass-industry-backed-covid-liability-shields-at-the-state-level/ [https://perma.cc/79J6-S5G2]
(“[ALEC] has long fought for restrictions on individuals’ right to sue in civil court because
of unsafe workplaces or products.”).
37. See Debbie Cenziper et al., As Nursing Home Residents Died, New COVID-19
Protections Shielded Companies from Lawsuits. Families Say That Hides the Truth, WASH.
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most employees were already unable to file lawsuits against their employers
for negligently-caused COVID-19 because workers’ compensation is the
“exclusive remedy” for physical injury or disease caused by work.38 Hence,
the real question for many workers sickened by COVID-19 was whether
workers’ compensation, an entirely state-based system, would cover work
disability and medical bills39 caused by the disease.40
Why might workers sickened by COVID-19 not be covered by workers’
compensation? Because workers’ compensation covers only illness, disease,
or injury “caused” by work, and many argued that COVID-19 was flatly
and categorically not caused by work. 41 This claim was, and is, an
oversimplification. This Article will discuss why proving causation of any
disease can be difficult under workers’ compensation,42 but is achievable.
Underscoring the difficulty, a number of states substantially modified workers’
compensation causation principles during the pandemic by creating
causation “presumptions.”43 A full discussion of the presumptions is beyond
POST (June 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/08/nursing-homeimmunity-laws/ [https://perma.cc/G6MT-DW6C].
38. 9 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 100.01 (2021).
In the early part of the 20th Century, states implemented workers’ compensation systems
because workers were frequently unable to prevail in tort suits and employers were concerned
about the potential for burgeoning tort liability in the context of a dangerous industrial
economy. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 88–89, 99, 101–02, 112–13 (2000). The
solution, or “grand bargain,” was to provide employees lesser but certain statutory benefits,
both saving them from destitution and insulating employers from large damage awards.
See Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work Injuries
in the United States, 1900–2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891, 904–05 (2017). Whether this is
still a good deal for the original parties to the Bargain is an open question.
39. Workers’ compensation provides cash payments and payments of medical
expenses in connection with injury and illness caused by work. See supra note 2; see also
infra note 54.
40. It is worth noting that gig workers who are actually adjudicated independent
contractors could not be covered by workers’ compensation and would not therefore
be impacted by the workers’ compensation principles about to be discussed. THOMAS O.
MCGARITY, MICHAEL C. DUFF & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, CTR. PROGRESSIVE REFORM, PROTECTING
WORKERS IN A PANDEMIC: WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE DOING 13 (2020);
see also, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding
that gig workers are independent contractors, not employees), rev’d on other grounds, 13
F.4th 908 (9th Cir. 2021). Those workers would also not be able to bring negligence suits
against their putative employers in states where civil immunities have been enacted. See
generally MCGARITY, DUFF & S HAPIRO , supra, at 34–36. Tort suits would, in any event,
be of limited short-term benefit because court cases take time many victims do not have.
41. See infra Part III.
42. See infra Part III.
43. As of December 2020, seventeen states had enacted workers’ compensation
COVID presumptions through legislative, executive, or other administrative action. See
Josh Cunningham, Covid-19: Workers’ Compensation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATORS
(Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/COVID-19-workers-
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the scope of this Article,44 which is aimed at analyzing COVID causation
under traditional principles of workers’ compensation without the aid of
presumptions. It is still worth mentioning, however, that some states seemed
to decide that COVID-19 causation was so hard to prove that the law
necessarily had to be altered, or no workers’ compensation coverage would
be possible.45 Accordingly, causation presumptions shifted the “burden
of proof” to employers to prove non-causation, making it more likely that
employees would be awarded workers’ compensation benefits.46 Eventually,
only about seventeen states followed this approach; however,47 only small
compensation.aspx [https://perma.cc/UDP3-9SZR]. Both houses of the Virginia legislature
passed a presumption bill in February 2021. Louise Esola, Virginia Lawmakers Pass
COVID-19 Presumption Measure, BUS. INS. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.businessinsurance.
com/article/20210217/NEWS08/912339870/Virginia-lawmakers-pass-COVID-19presumption-measure-governor-coronavirus-pandem [https://perma.cc/W7VP-W9PR].
44. Work causation of COVID-19 is presumed for various categories of “essential
workers” and the employer has the burden of showing that an employee’s COVID-19 was
not caused by the workplace. See John F. Burton, Jr., COVID-19 as an Occupational Disease:
The Challenge for Workers’ Compensation, WORKERS’ FIRST WATCH MAG., Special Edition
2021, at 5, 19.
45. Although some read into this extraordinary coverage policy illegitimacy, it is
consistent with the creation of workers’ compensation in the early twentieth century made
necessary by the failure of negligence cases through operation of affirmative defenses.
See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 38, at 4. Then, as now in the “presumption states,”
a policy decision was made not to allow the entire loss of a harm fall on the victims of
injury. See id.
46. Usually, in the American legal system, persons seeking some kind of legal remedy
(in the civil system typically money) have the burden of proving certain preliminary,
threshold facts as a prerequisite to obtaining the remedy. See, e.g., 2 STUART M. SPEISER,
CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 7:13 (Monique C.M.
Leahy ed., 2021) (explaining elements of negligence prima facie case). A presumption is “a
legal inference or assumption that a fact exists because of the known or proven existence
of some other fact or group of facts . . . [and] shifts the burden of production or persuasion
to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption.” Presumption,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The presumption assists those seeking remedies
by creating factual shortcuts for obtaining the remedies. James J. Vedder & Brittney M.
Miller, Presumptions in Paternity Cases: Who Is the Father in the Eyes of the Law?, AM.
BAR (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/family_law/publications/familyadvocate/2018/spring/4spring2018-vedder/ [https://perma.cc/9BVX-QSAS]. For an explanation
of how such presumptions operate in workers’ compensation in the context of certain
cancer cases, see DAVID B. TORREY, NAT’L ASS’N WORKERS’ COMP. JUDICIARY, FIREFIGHTER
CANCER PRESUMPTION STATUTES IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND RELATED LAWS: AN
INTRODUCTION AND A STATUTORY/REGULATORY/CASE LAW TABLE 1, 8–10 (2013).
47. The number was somewhat fluid during the pandemic and some applications of
presumptions were difficult to detect. Compare SAIF, COVID-19 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
PRESUMPTION BY STATE (2020), with Cunningham, supra note 43.

299

DUFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/27/2022 9:21 AM

numbers of employees in presumption states were covered as the presumptions
generally only applied to narrowly defined “essential employees.”48 Some
states’ workers’ compensation laws have also historically excluded from
coverage disability caused by “infectious diseases” or “ordinary diseases
of life.”49 In effect, both the pro-coverage slant of presumptions, and the
anti-coverage tilt of categorical exclusions of certain classes of diseases,
betray a shared assumption in many states that proving or disproving workplace
causation of disease is unacceptably complex, or even impossible.50 This
Article aims to rectify that oversimplification. Coverage of COVID-19 is
not, as is sometimes claimed,51 wildly contrary or repugnant to workers’
compensation doctrine, a limiting view likely to lead to cramped policy
decisions when other choices are possible.
Despite inherent disease causation complexities, very early on in workers’
compensation history, the system began to cover “occupational diseases.”52
Courts and legislatures recognized that, in the absence of workers’
compensation coverage, civil tort actions could be brought by employees
for harms caused by wrongful exposure to occupational diseases; 53
“exclusivity”54 in such circumstances could likely not be constitutionally
maintained.55 Before the process of American coverage of occupational
48. See WCRI Estimates Number of Workers Covered by State COVID-19 Presumptions,
W ORKERS ’ C OMP . R SCH . I NST . (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.wcrinet.org/news/pressreleases/wcri-estimates-number-of-workers-covered-by-state-COVID-19-presumptions
[https://perma.cc/6E5C-E7YB]. The data was incomplete as this Article was being composed,
but probably fewer than five percent of employees were covered by presumptions in most
states where they were enacted. See id.
49. 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 53.01.
50. See generally id. § 52.02.
51. See, e.g., Christopher J. Boggs, Coronavirus, Pandemics and Workers’ Compensation,
INS. J. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2020/
02/19/558705.htm [https://perma.cc/9R7E-S8LB].
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See WALTER F. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 757–
60 (1936).
54. Exclusivity is the principle that workers’ compensation is an employee’s exclusive
remedy against his or her employer for injury or disease caused by work. LARSON, supra
note 38.
55. See DODD, supra note 53, at 757–60. Dodd’s discussion of occupational disease
coverage presumes that constitutional problems would arise if an employee were left with
no remedy. See id. at 758; see also Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 194 N.E. 61, 64 (N.Y.
1934) (“There still is a field [i.e., disease,] in which the statute fails to impose liability, on
the part of an employer, to provide compensation for injury or death, regardless of fault;
and in which an injured person may seek damages by action at law, where there has been
fault. Whether the Legislature should provide a more effective and comprehensive remedy
in such cases, or whether the employer should in such cases be relieved of liability even
in case of fault, is a matter which concerns the Legislature and not the courts.” (emphasis
added)). The same assumption appears to have been made in a relatively recent Pennsylvania
case. See Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851, 865 (Pa. 2013) (holding that injuries
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disease had even begun, the English Workmen’s Compensation Act of
1906—a progenitor of early American workers’ compensation statutes—
covered certain occupational diseases.56 It actually went further by presuming
coverage of diseases listed in “schedules” whenever employees incapacitated
by those diseases engaged in designated categories of work.57 Massachusetts,
from the inception of its workers’ compensation statute, covered occupational
diseases, and by 1917 California and Wisconsin had done the same.58 By
1954, all but two states, Wyoming and Mississippi, had formally covered
occupational diseases.59
During periods of “contagion,” workers’ compensation has also at times
covered employees incapacitated by the relevant contagious disease,60 and
there is no inherent doctrinal obstacle to covering disability caused by
pandemic diseases.61 The customary “increased risk” requirement for
establishing workers’ compensation coverage62 may generally be satisfied
with respect to essential workers during pandemic lockdowns if sensible
risk comparisons are made.63 On workplace premises during a lockdown,

suffered by employees as a result of their contraction of work-related mesothelioma fell
outside the relevant statute of limitations and were therefore not covered by the workers’
compensation act necessarily allowing the employees a common law action in tort). The
implication in Tooey appears to be that workers may not constitutionally be left without a
remedy. Id. at 865.
56. The Act covered anthrax, lead poisoning, mercury poisoning, phosphorous
poisoning, arsenic poisoning, and Ancylostomiasis, also known as hookworm disease.
DEP’T. OF COM. & LAB., BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR NO. 70, at 652 (1907) (citing
Workmens’ Compensation Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 58 (Gr. Brit.)). Early New York and
Minnesota workers’ compensation acts modelled the same approach. DODD, supra note
53, at 768.
57. When the employee worked in the employer’s work “processes,” causation of
the listed diseases was presumed. DODD, supra note 53, at 768. The processes included
handling wool, using lead, mercury, phosphorous, or arsenic, and mining. DEP’T. OF COM.
& LABOR., supra note 56, at 652; see, e.g., 94 ELIZABETH M. BOSEK ET AL., OHIO JURIS.
WORKERS’ COMP. § 170 (3d ed. 2021). These were known as “two-column” schedules. DODD,
supra note 53, at 768.
58. HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION:
PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 49 (1954).
59. Id. at 49–50. Eventually states covered occupational diseases either through
their workers’ compensation statutes or under standalone occupational disease statutes.
Id. at 50.
60. See infra Part III.B. Tuberculosis is an especially well-known example. See 4
LARSON, supra note 38, § 52.04.
61. See infra Part III.B.
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part IV.A.
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for example, essential employees’ risk of contracting contagious diseases
is, by definition, elevated above that of the general public,64 which is in
this context unable to serve as a point of comparison, as it does in other
contexts.65 Even in non-lockdown contexts, essential employees required
to work in high population density, “conjugate” workplaces—or among
the general public—should be able to establish causation under traditional
workers’ compensation rules: Either conjugate workplaces will possess
risk for employees on-premises in excess of that encountered by the
general public given the perpetual close physical contact with other highrisk persons;66 or, in the case of traveling employees, employees may be
covered under the street-risk doctrine given their continual exposure to
the elevated contagion risks of the street, their de facto workplace.67
III. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: CORE CAUSATION PRINCIPLES
To have a sensible discussion about COVID-19 causation in workers’
compensation, certain first principles of workers’ compensation causation
must be considered. One argument for not covering COVID under workers’
compensation is that the general public is at the same risk of contracting
the disease as employees in the workplace, with the resulting inference
that the illness is not work-related.68 This Part analyzes whether this “equal
risk” argument is true and universally warrants denying workers’ compensation
coverage to employees contracting COVID-19.
A. Workers’ Compensation Does Not Absolutely Bar
Coverage of “Neutral Risk” Injury
Workers’ compensation causation terminology is arcane. Instead of
analyzing whether conduct was the “actual” and “proximate” cause of an
injury, as in negligence law,69 workers’ compensation asks whether an injury
or disease “arises out of employment;” a conceptually related question,70
64. See infra Part IV.A.
65. See infra Part III.A.
66. See infra Part III.A. Hence the unacceptability of the meatpacking cases mentioned
in the Introduction is obvious.
67. See infra Part III.A.
68. See infra Part III.A.
69. GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JOSEPH SANDERS & W. JONATHAN CARDI, CASES & MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 359 (5th ed. 2012).
70. Some balk at any comparison between tort and workers’ compensation law for
fear that key distinctions between the two bodies of law will be underemphasized. See,
e.g., 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 4.01 (emphatically drawing distinctions between the two
systems). But the law of causation necessarily straddles multiple liability regimes. See,
e.g., id. § 1.03. Even where liability may be imposed without fault, for example, it can
never be imposed without demonstrating the liable actor was the “cause” of the complaining
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but one that turns explicitly on notions of “risk” and does not involve
considerations of fault.71 As the leading workers’ compensation treatise,
Larson’s, puts it, workers’ compensation law “require[s] a showing that the
injury was caused by an increased risk . . . ”72 This idea may seem muddy
to laypersons unfamiliar with the law, or to lawyers unfamiliar with causation
terminology––an injury “arises out of” employment if it is “caused” by a
certain kind of risk?73 In a sense causation does not seem directly addressed
by the formulation.74 The causation-risk analysis might be clarified by
breaking it down into a series of practical steps. First, there is disability
risk: The probability that engaging in a particular work activity may lead
to disability for work; then there is actual resulting disability for work; if
that actual disability was in fact produced by work activity likely to have
produced it, the disability may be said to “arise out of” employment, and
it is traditionally compensable under workers’ compensation.75 So, for
example, imagine that an employee has an “increased risk” of being struck
in the head at work by a kind of falling object. The employee is then actually
struck in the head by the falling object, and the event results in the
employee’s disability. The disability should be compensable under the
increased risk workers’ compensation causation rule.76 The increased risk
limitation is effectively a cognate of the negligence phrases “proximate
cause” or “legal cause,” for it defines the scope of liability, even assuming
an injury or disease has been factually caused by workplace activity.77
party’s harm. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 26 (2021). Furthermore, such an inquiry will often
pit notions of “scientific” causation against the question of how far the scope of liability
should travel. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
71. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 4.01.
72. Id. § 3 Synopsis.
73. See id.
74. The structure is similar to the excess risk/background risk terminology that is
common in the toxic tort literature. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849,
856–57 (1984) (discussing these terms).
75. This causation definition has been elusive for decades. See SOMERS & SOMERS,
supra note 58, at 54–55 (“Inescapably, the line of demarcation between occupational and
non-occupational disability is becoming increasingly blurred . . . .”).
76. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3 Synopsis.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 30 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“An actor is not
liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct was of a type that does not
generally increase the risk of that harm.”). Further, under comment a of the same section,
“An actor’s tortious conduct may be a factual cause of harm under § 26 but not be of a
type such as to affect the probability of such harm occurring, for “greater care by the actor
would not reduce the frequency of such accidents.” Id. § 30 cmt. a.
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Thus, as is often true in negligence law, in workers’ compensation, under
the increased risk test, not all harms that are factually caused by an actor’s
––the employer’s––conduct create liability in the actor.78
But how can one definitively say, in advance, that an employee’s
chance of being disabled in any particular way is increased by a specific
work activity? Formally, cases have designated certain risks of injury as
“incident to employment” or, expressed somewhat differently, as obvious
“employment risks.”79 This idea works reasonably well in, for example,
a shipyard replete with cranes winching freight throughout the workplace.
The risk of an employee being struck by such freight has obviously been
increased by the workplace, and one might be willing to concede that the
“winch risk” is an “employment risk.” Yet, even in such intuitively highrisk workplaces as shipyards, cases requiring deliberation may develop:
An employee is not, for example, struck in the head by winched freight at
the shipyard but instead trips and falls on level ground, and is injured
when she strikes the ground. Some courts have said that in such contexts
the injury was not the product of an “employment” risk. 80 The risk of
falling on level ground is arguably in such a situation shared equally with
the general public’s risks of falling anywhere, and it is not unique to our
hypothetical shipyard: As a risk shared with the public it may be deemed,
under workers’ compensation law, as “neutral,” and not distinctly employmentrelated.81 The neutral risk designation may, in turn, be overly simplistic.
The shipyard may regularly, or occasionally operate at a harried pace, making
various, arguably neutral-risk mishaps more likely. Thus, one swiftly realizes
that, while certain risks of injury leading to disability may be inherently
related to a given type of employment––and hence “employment” risks—
other risks may look like neutral risks; for example, falling on level ground
in the shipyard for no apparent work-related reason. Accordingly, the
78. Cf. id. § 29 cmt. a (“No serious question exists that some limit on the scope of
liability for tortious conduct that causes harm is required.”).
79. See supra note 71 (describing “Risks Distinctly Associated with the Employment”).
80. Typically, injuries that result from unexplained falls and not the product of an
“idiopathic” medical condition are compensable, but courts have found to the contrary.
See, e.g., Maradiaga v. Specialty Finishing, 884 N.W.2d 153, 153, 162 (Neb. Ct. App.
2016) (holding that a worker twisting her ankle after exiting a vehicle in the employer’s
parking lot did not sustain a compensable injury). The issue is intertwined with the problem of
whether an “accident” has occurred, an additional predicate for coverage under the workers’
compensation statutes of several states. See 3 LARSON , supra note 38, § 42.01 (“The
requirement that the injury be accidental in character has been adopted either legislatively
or judicially by the overwhelming majority of states.”).
81. A neutral risk of injury or disease leading to disability is “of neither distinctly
employment nor distinctly personal character.” 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 4.03. In our
hypothetical winching workplace mishap, for example, the injury has arguably been caused
neither by the winched freight nor by a purely preexisting physical condition “personal”
to the injured employee.
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workers’ compensation scope of liability is extremely fact-sensitive and
may at times depend on the intensity of importation of otherwise neutral
risks into a workplace.82
Workers’ compensation laws presumptively cover disability caused by
risks the workplace has increased,83 and presumptively do not cover disability
caused by neutral risks84—but these presumptions are often broadly rebuttable.85
Furthermore, as John Burton has remarked,86 even the treatises are at times
imprecise about whether the “increased risk” test applies both to employment
risks and neutral risks, or only to risks that are usually deemed neutral, but
have been elevated in a workplace above that experienced by the general
public.87 One way to resolve the problem is to assume that when states
deem particular risks “employment risks” they have implicitly recognized
that those risks emerge with sufficient frequency in particular types of
work to be conclusively presumed “increased” in those contexts.88 In such
cases, the designated risks in effect achieve “presumptive” increased risk
status, because they are risks to which the general public is seldom, if ever,
exposed.89
Thus, the increased risk/neutral risk coverage dichotomy is insufficiently
precise because injuries resulting from apparently neutral risks are sometimes
covered by workers’ compensation.90 First, and probably most intuitively,
“an employee may recover for an injury caused by a neutral risk if she
82. See id. §§ 3.03, 4.01.
83. The increased-risk test is the majority rule in the United States. Id. § 3.03.
84. Usually coverage of neutral risks “is approved and used in very particular
situations.” Id. § 3.05.
85. Id. § 4 Synopsis.
86. Burton, supra note 44, at 8 (“As far as the ‘arising’ test is concerned, this group
causes no trouble, since all these risks fall readily within the increased-risk test and are
considered work-connected in all jurisdictions.” (quoting 1 LARSON, supra note 38, §
4.01)).
87. See supra note 71. For example, the Larson’s treatise, within the space of two
chapters, describes the increased risk test as both applying to neutral risks and applying to
risks “distinctly associated with employment”—that is, as employment risks. Compare 1
LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.03, with id. § 4.01.
88. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for example, follows the treatise definition
that “[e]mployment-related risks include ‘all the obvious kinds of injur[ies] that one thinks
of at once as industrial injur[ies]’ . . . .” In re Margeson, 27 A.3d 663, 667 (N.H. 2011)
(quoting 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 4.01). This definition seems tautological, and it may
be more precise to say that an injury has become over time “obviously” associated with
“industry.”
89. See id.
90. See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 4.03.
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demonstrates that her injury resulted from ‘a risk greater than that to
which the general public is exposed.’”91 This principle may be thought of
in contrast to “presumptive” employment risks of the type just discussed:
A normally neutral risk—of walking, for example—becomes elevated because
of a specific situation in a workplace. One might object that in this instance
the neutral risk is no longer neutral. The work function, however, may be
so similar to what is routine that it is difficult to conceive of as other than
a neutral risk that “just so happened” to become increased.
In other circumstances, workers’ compensation has covered injuries
produced by neutral risks that were not in any respect increased by the
nature of employment.92 The “positional risk test” functions in these instances
as a minority rule of “but for” causation covering neutral risks: Were it
not for the employee’s “position” or presence in the workplace, the injury
would not have occurred.93 Some states have, in related neutral circumstances,
applied the “actual risk” test, which affords coverage to neutral risks “as
long as the employment subjected claimant to the actual risk that caused
the injury.”94 States may use the positional risk and actual risk test formulations
somewhat loosely. Under Virginia law, for example, the difference between
the two tests seems to be that the actual risk test, unlike the positional risk
test, would deny coverage when an employee is exposed to a neutral risk
to the same degree as a member of the general public, but grant coverage
where an employee is exposed to a neutral risk to a degree exceeding that
of the general public.95 Expressed in this way, however, the test seems
difficult to distinguish from mere application of the increased risk test to
neutral risks, which may explain why this articulation of the actual risk
test is limited to Virginia.96 But the customary understanding of “actual

91. In re Doody, 235 A.3d 1000, 1004 (N.H. 2020) (quoting Margeson, 27 A.3d at
672).
92. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.05.
93. Id. More precisely, “but for” causation is normally a rule of actual (or factual)
causation, not proximate causation, or scope of liability; so one might conceptualize positional
risk as a rule authorizing liability to the limits of establishment of actual causation, roughly
equivalent to the “direct cause” test in negligence as exemplified by In re Polemis &
Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
94. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.04.
95. Baggett Transp. Co. of Birmingham v. Dillon, 248 S.E.2d 819, 822–23 (Va.
1978) (denying compensation where there was no causal connection between truck driver’s
employment and his death from a gunshot wound inflicted by an unknown assailant).
96. The Larson’s treatise appears to have borrowed the phrase from Virginia, which
uses the test inconsistently, but, as Larson’s acknowledges, the test is a specialized application
allowing for “recoveries in most street-risk cases and in a much greater proportion of actof-God cases.” See 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.04. Oklahoma’s risk tests have varied
over the last two decades but appear now to have re-embraced the actual risk test in certain
circumstances, “[t]he actual risk test allows recovery when the employer subjects the
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risk” seems much closer to a specialized application of the positional risk
test, affording coverage to injuries that are the product of neutral risks.97
The actual risk test allows recovery when the employer subjects the worker to the
very risk that injures him or her. The actual-risk test ignores whether the risk
faced by the employee was also common to the public, and a claimant may
recover so long as the employment subjects him or her to the actual risk that
causes the injury.98

Both the positional and actual risk doctrines, however styled, reflect
relatively relaxed rules of proximate causation. This commonly encountered
relaxation reveals a deliberate policy retreat from coverage only of harms
resulting from increased risks, whether they be “employment” risks or
unusually elevated neutral risks. Why? Traditional pockets of expansion
of coverage seem to serve the dual function of insulating employers from
isolated instances of tort liability, and plugging recurring gaps in employee
disability coverage. 99 Unexplained falls at work, for example, are very
commonly covered under the positional risk rule.100 The alternative would
be to deny coverage to a significant swath of injuries; although, unexplained
falls could probably not form the basis of a tort suit and the rule is likely
the product of an employee coverage rationale.
The logic of increased risk relaxation applies with particular cogency
when an employee could not have been injured unless acting in the interests
of an employer.101 An employee stocking shelves at a supermarket falls
and cannot explain precisely how. 102 A delivery driver is injured when

worker to the very risk that injures him.” K-Mart Corp. v. Herring, 188 P.3d 140, 146–47
(Okla. 2008).
97. See 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.04.
98. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 226 (2021).
99. See Insuring Your Business: Small Business Owners’ Guide to Insurance, INS.
INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/publications/insuring-your-business-small-business-ownersguide-to-insurance/specific-coverages/workers-compensation-insurance [https://perma.cc/
4FGC-S4EK].
100. Logsdon v. Isco Co., 618 N.W.2d 667, 673–74 (Neb. 2000) (holding that
unexplained head injuries suffered at work were produced by a neutral risk and therefore
presumed to have arisen out of employment).
101. Id. at 673 (noting that some injuries at work “would not have happened if the
employee had not been engaged upon an employment errand” at the time of the injury).
102. Id. The test—or something very close to it—has been applied in cases of “street
risks,” unexplained falls, and “acts of God.” See Arthur Larson, The Positional-Risk
Doctrine in Workmen’s Compensation, 1973 DUKE L.J. 761, 764–65. It is not surprising
that Nebraska adopted coverage of positional risks given the prevalence of “neutral risk”
tornados striking workplaces in that state. Nippert v. Shinn Farm Constr. Co., 388 N.W.2d
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her delivery truck runs into a pothole to which members of the general
public were also exposed––a neutral risk––yet is covered under the “street
risk doctrine,” a well-known exception to the increased risk requirement
that allows for workers’ compensation coverage of neutral risks to employees
who routinely work in “the street” as delivery persons, cab drivers, and
the like.103 In cases of this type, employees systematically excluded from
workers’ compensation coverage might suffer destitution or have a colorable
claim for access to negligence actions—though they would be put to the
trouble inherent in bringing a negligence case, one of the motivating factors
for establishment of workers’ compensation in the first place.104
Neutral risk exceptions arise with sufficient frequency that the workers’
compensation system had to develop isolated, fact-sensitive rules to help
categorize them,105 and it is not unusual for states to apply the increased
risk rule to most injuries but some version of positional risk to more

820, 822 (Neb. 1986); see also 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 5.01 (describing the positional
risk coverage of neutral risks trend and speculating as to whether it will subsume “Act of
God” cases).
103. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 6 Synopsis.
All courts now agree that street or highway injuries to employees such as
traveling salespeople, delivery persons, and solicitors, whose duties increase
their exposure to the hazards of the street, arise out of the employment, although
the nature of the risk, as distinguished from the degree, is not peculiar to the
employment. A large number of courts have gone one step further by holding
that injury from such risks is compensable regardless of whether such exposure
is continuous or only occasional, so long as the exposure is in fact occasioned
by the employment. At the same time, the concept of street risks has been
broadened far beyond the original idea of traffic perils, and has been applied to
almost any mishap whose locale is the street, including simple falls, stray bullets,
falling trees, and foul balls.
Id.
104. See id. § 1.03 (contrasting workers’ compensation with tort).
105. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Herring, 188 P.3d 140, 146–47 (Okla. 2008) (finding
that employee shot in fast food drive thru line off the employer’s premises was entitled to
workers’ compensation benefits under the actual risk test); Schwan Food Co. v. Frederick,
211 A.3d 659, 670–82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019) (describing the “constellation of factual
determinations” required to analyze whether a claimant’s injury from slipping on black ice
on the sidewalk by his car in front of his home as he was dropping off his child at daycare
on the way to work occurred in the course of his employment and is thus compensable
under the positional risk test); Clark v. D.C. Dep’t Emp. Servs., 743 A.2d 722, 727, 730–
31 (D.C. 2000) (applying positional risk test to find compensable an injury suffered by an
employee when an unknown assailant shot her for unknown reasons in the parking lot of
her employer); Milledge v. The Oaks, 784 N.E.2d 926, 932–34 (Ind. 2003) (applying
positional risk test to case of unexplained fall but implying more broadly that positional
risk test applied to all cases of injuries produced by neutral risks). The Larson’s treatise
discusses additional cases involving lightning, windstorms, tornadoes, insects and birds,
unexplained falls, and assaults by lunatics. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 7.03.
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specialized cases.106 The overriding theme of neutral risk exceptions is
that states have created doctrinal authority to carve out exceptions to the
default rule of increased risk on public policy grounds, especially when
employees are injured while serving the interests of the employer.107 Disability
produced by neutral risks has been covered by workers’ compensation on
policy grounds throughout the system’s history.108 The claim that disability
produced by contraction of COVID-19 could not be covered and is absolutely
barred under workers’ compensation doctrine simply because it arises from
a neutral risk, where that is actually the case, is not supportable. Coverage
of neutral risks is a policy decision.
B. Workers’ Compensation Does Not Absolutely Bar Neutral
Risk Coverage of Disease
Disease does not, of course, fit comfortably within the “winching
workplace” sketched above.109 First, before launching into causation, it is
necessary to mention that some workers’ compensation statutes by their
terms cover only disability that is produced by “accident.”110 The definition
of accident differs from state to state,111 but it is enough for the purposes
of this Article to acknowledge that if work injuries are defined solely in
terms of disability caused by a discrete, one-time, unexpected event, disease
is not likely to be covered by workers’ compensation.112 In that event,
however, persons should be able to bring tort suits for negligent exposure
to a disease.113
Moving beyond accident provisions, certain diseases seem clearly
occupational and related to specific kinds of work and have always seemed

106. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.05; 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 256
(2021).
107. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 3.05.
108. Id. § 4.03 (noting in the past an employee had the burden of proof to establish
“affirmatively a clear causal connection between the conditions under which the employee
worked and the occurrence of the injury”).
109. Id. § 52.02 (“Occupational disease coverage historically lagged far behind
‘accident’ coverage in the United States.”).
110. Id. § 42.01 (“The requirement that the injury be accidental in character has been
adopted either legislatively or judicially by the overwhelming majority of states.”).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 42.03. Further discussion is unnecessary and beyond the scope of this Article.
113. See supra note 55.
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so.114 Members of the general public do not, for example, develop black
lung.115 Certain signature diseases can only develop upon exposure to
a substance that is usually, but not exclusively, encountered in workplaces.116
Mesothelioma, for example, may be causally connectable to the workplace,
but often only laboriously.117 It is often said that “[u]nder most state workers’
compensation statutes, there are two types of compensable diseases: (1)
diseases naturally resulting from a compensable accidental injury or following
as an incident of an occupational disease, and (2) occupational diseases.”118
The conventional doctrinal follow-on is that “legislature[s] did not intend
to impose on the employer liability for diseases contracted outside the
workplace, or to transform the workers’ compensation act into a general
health and benefit insurance program that would compensate an employee
for all contagious diseases.”119 States balance competing policy considerations
in this area either through enactment of a standalone occupational disease
statute or through occupational disease provisions located within their general
workers’ compensation statutes. 120 But all states now formally cover
occupational disease.121
In the end, an occupational disease is what a legislature defines it to be,
and that definition is subject to change.122 Furthermore, unless a legislature
has explicitly excluded coverage of particular diseases, it remains open to
claimants to attempt to prove that contraction of a disease arose out of
employment—either under the shelter of a statutory occupational disease
designation, or through ordinary principles of workers’ compensation
causation.123 If, for whatever policy reason, a legislature categorically

114. See S OMERS & S OMERS, supra note 58, at 49 n.14 (describing historical
discussions of occupational disease dating to the Roman Empire).
115. See Maya Wei-Haas, Why Black Lung Disease Is Deadlier Than Ever Before,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 15, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/
black-lung-disease-deadlier-than-ever-before-180963303/ [https://perma.cc/5Q3D-QKVM]
(noting that black lung is caused by breathing coal mine dust). Background environmental
factors like smoking “can lead to further lung damage and can make symptoms worse.”
Angela Nelson, What Is Black Lung Disease?, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/lung/
black-lung-disease [https://perma.cc/8D85-YE8D].
116. See Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1251–52 (1987)
(“The odds of contracting mesothelioma are roughly seventy times greater for asbestos workers
than for members of the general population. This means that when an asbestos worker gets
mesothelioma, it is almost certainly caused by asbestos.”).
117. See, e.g., Indus. Indem. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 193 Cal. Rptr.
471, 473–75 (1983).
118. 2 JON L. GELMAN, MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 109:1 (2021).
119. Id. § 109:11.
120. 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 52.01.
121. Id.
122. See generally 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 291 (2021).
123. Id. § 290.
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excludes workers’ compensation coverage of a disease, dual denial of a
civil tort action to an employee against her employer for alleged wrongful
exposure to that disease––as seemed to be occurring during the pandemic124
––raises serious constitutional issues.125 Employees should, accordingly,
always be permitted the default of attempting to show that the workplace
increased the risk of contracting any disease, even if the risk of contraction
is neutral. Furthermore, as the Larson’s treatise observes in connection
with infectious diseases:
In . . . contagious-disease cases, it is impossible to divorce the increased-risk
issue from the evidentiary question whether the claimant in fact contracted the
disease in the particular place to which the employment took claimant. Several
cases have allowed recovery on the “preponderance of probabilities,” when the
place of work was attended with a much higher proportionate risk of infection; and by
the same showing, of course, the requirement of increased risk for purposes of
the “arising” test was satisfied.126

Legislatures may not have intended for workers’ compensation to cover
diseases contracted outside of the workplace,127 but the factual question
of whether a disease has actually been contracted outside of the workplace,
as an employer might allege, should not be cavalierly ignored, operating
as a form of presumption against causation, and courts have been loath to
do so.128 In other words, employees should not be prevented from arguing
that they contracted a disease, that is often encountered outside of the
workplace, within the workplace. Many courts permit this showing if the
workers’ compensation disease provisions in a given state are sufficiently
broad.129 As discussed earlier in the Article,130 an increased neutral risk
may become an employment risk over time; today’s neutral risk disease

124. As of July of 2021, approximately twenty states were continuing with the broad
COVID-19 civil immunity provisions on the books from earlier in the pandemic. See
CHUBB, COVID-19 CIVIL LIABILITY IMMUNITY – STATE ACTIVITY 2021 (2021). Thirty-five
states in all considered continuation. See id.
125. See Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851, 864 (Pa. 2013); supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
126. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 5.05.
127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
128. 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 52.04 (discussing tendency of courts to interpret
occupational disease broadly when a statute does not explicitly compel a narrow definition).
129. See id.
130. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
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may become tomorrow’s occupational disease as the state of science
advances.131
Still, infectious diseases,132 or “ordinary diseases of life,”133 are at times
explicitly and categorically excluded from coverage by states, on the apparent
theory that they could not have been caused by work.134 Yet, categorical
noncoverage of these diseases––or of any diseases––under workers’
compensation ought to release claimants from exclusivity, and revive their
ability to file tort actions as a matter of both workers’ compensation theory
and constitutional law.135 This seems a fair result given the quid pro quo
nature of workers’ compensation, and hardly represents an illegitimate
expansion of liability. After all, if a claimant’s contraction of a disease
really cannot be proven causally related to work, as an immunizing legislature
apparently presumes, even if the employer was negligent in exposing the
employee to the disease, no liability could result—such a case should not
survive summary judgment.136 Although proof of causation in workers’
compensation is impacted significantly by explicit statutory disease language,
nothing in general workers’ compensation doctrine absolutely bars coverage
of disability produced by neutral risks of contracting disease. If it did, tort
actions would probably be broadly available,137 a fact legislatures have no
doubt considered carefully over the years.
C. Workers’ Compensation Rules of Medical Causation Are Based on
Reasonable Certainty, Not Absolute Certainty
In workers’ compensation cases involving non-obvious causation, claimants
must satisfy both legal and medical causation tests. 138 Legal causation
involves the risk classification scheme discussed above—an injury or
disease may be the product of an increased risk, a neutral risk, or a purely
personal risk that is not covered under workers’ compensation.139 If work-

131. 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 52.04 (discussing historical tendency of courts to
expand the concept of occupational disease in borderline cases).
132. Cf. id. § 4.01 (discussing workplace risks although notably excluding discussion
of “infectious diseases”).
133. Id. § 52.033 (acknowledging that the “ordinary disease of life” distinction is
made under many statutes but observing there is no “measuring stick” to distinguish such
ordinary diseases from occupational diseases).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
136. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS §
183 (2d ed. 2011).
137. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
138. 3 LARSON, supra note 38, § 46.03 (explaining that causation test has “two parts:
the legal and the medical”).
139. See supra Part III.B.
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related disability is covered as a matter of law under this classificatory
scheme—essentially a proximate cause inquiry—the employee is eligible
for workers’ compensation if the disability was caused, in a medical sense,
by the legally “eligible” injury or illness, which is essentially a factual
causation question.140 The employee receives a blow to the head from a
winched piece of freight. The workplace increased the risk of the incident
occurring—the blow to the head. But the blow to the head must also be
medically––factually––linked to the subsequent work disability experienced
by the employee, and that link normally must be established by expert
testimony.141 According to the Larson’s treatise,
Under the legal test, the law must define what kind of exertion satisfies the test
of “arising out of the employment.” Under the medical test, the doctors must say
whether the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in
fact caused this collapse. All too often these two tests are scrambled together.
When this happens, the effect is usually that one is lost sight of. 142

Under this dual medical-legal causation test, medical causation is irrelevant
until legal causation has been established.143 This can be somewhat jarring
to those accustomed to negligence causation analyses, where for reasons
of efficiency, the factual causation inquiry will tend to precede that of
legal causation.144 In some workers’ compensation situations, no expert
medical testimony is required to establish factual causation because a
natural inference based on human experience is sufficient to demonstrate
causal connection.145 The Larson’s treatise discusses a case in which an
employee developed a pathological condition after being injured by a
direct blow in the workplace that required surgical intervention.146 Following
an appeal by the involved employer/insurer carrier on the grounds that no

140. 3 LARSON, supra note 38, § 46.03.
141. Id.
142. Id. Although Larson’s was discussing this causation principle as applied to
work-related heart attacks, the analysis is not limited to that context.
143. See id. § 46.03 n.29.
144. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 136, § 200 (carefully delineating
the two steps of the causation analysis and stating that “[i]t is quite correct to say that the
plaintiff must normally prove factual cause and that if the plaintiff fails to do so, she will
lose.”); see also id. § 183.
145. 3 LARSON, supra note 38, § 46.03; 12 id. § 128.02 (“In appropriate circumstances,
awards may be made when medical evidence on . . . the relation of the employment to the
injury, or relation of the injury to the disability . . . medical terms [or] what the injury or
disease is . . . is inconclusive, indecisive, fragmentary, inconsistent, or even nonexistent.”).
146. See id. § 128.02 (discussing Valente v. Bourne Mills, 75 A.2d 191 (R.I. 1950)).

313

DUFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/27/2022 9:21 AM

medical evidence connected the physical blow to development of the
pathological condition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court said:
The . . . contention, as stated, if literally followed would turn a compensation
case into a clinic where doctors seek to determine the ‘diagnosis’ of a patient’s
ailment and the ‘pathological nature’ of that condition according to the more
exacting norms of medical science. The application of so strict a rule to establish
the required causal relationship in the field of law, where the ultimate objective
is the attainment of substantial justice according to the remedial purposes and
provisions of the act, would cast an unfair burden upon a person injured by
accident.147

A physical blow is of course distinguishable from the contraction of a
disease. It is nonetheless well-established that medical testimony is not
always necessary to support a workers’ compensation award for occupational
disease if surrounding circumstances create a sufficiently strong basis for
lay causation inferences.148 Yet, it is also settled that medical testimony
is required “when the medical question is no longer an uncomplicated one
and carries the factfinders into realms that are properly within the province of
medical experts.”149 This principle has frequently been applied in the context
of disease causation.150 When medical evidence is required to establish
causation, a common formulation of the standard is that an award is supportable
when a medical expert finds “to a reasonable medical certainty” that
disability has been caused—in a medical sense—by working conditions.151
It is also important to note, however, that when a claimant has shown that
a disease was probably caused by her working conditions—in a manner
that seems natural to a lay judge—an award will not be reversed “merely
because the medical profession does not fully understand the etiology of
the disease.”152
Concern that workers’ compensation factfinders may apply higher proof
standards of causation sub silentio is likely what prompted firefighters’
labor organizations in recent years to lobby legislatures––and win––various
disease presumptions.153 Similar proof standard problems surface in toxic
147. Id. (citing Valente, 75 A.2d at 194).
148. 12 LARSON, supra note 38, §128.02 (collecting cases for this proposition in the
digest to the same section).
149. Id. § 128.05.
150. See id.
151. 12 LARSON, supra note 38, § 130.06D n.4. Medical causation standards vary a
great deal from state to state but the thrust of the authority holds that medical opinion,
where required, must be expressed in terms of reasonable probabilities and not possibilities. Id.
152. Id. §130.06.
153. Id. § 52.07 (“An interesting recent phenomenon has been the burgeoning in all
parts of the country of statutes granting special compensation coverage to firemen or
policemen or both, for respiratory and heart diseases connected with the exertions of the
employment.”).
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tort law, where civil courts must often analyze factual causation questions
in terms of general and specific causation: A toxin must be both capable
of causing a disease––general causation––and the substance must have
caused the plaintiff’s disease––specific causation.154 Although tort causation
analysis differs from that of workers’ compensation, cautionary commentary
from the Restatement Third of Torts seems relevant to both bodies of law:
[C]ourts may be relying on a view that “science” presents an “objective” method
of establishing that, in all cases, reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of
factual causation. Such a view is incorrect. First, scientific standards for the
sufficiency of evidence to establish a proposition may be inappropriate for the
law, which itself must decide the minimum amount of evidence permitting a
reasonable (and, therefore, permissible) inference, as opposed to speculation that
is not permitted. . . . [S]cientists report that an evaluation of data and scientific
evidence to determine whether an inference of causation is appropriate requires
judgment and interpretation. Scientists are subject to their own value judgments
and preexisting biases that may affect their view of a body of evidence. There are
instances in which although one scientist or group of scientists comes to one conclusion
about factual causation, they recognize that another group that comes to a contrary
conclusion might still be “reasonable.” These scientists’ views reflect their scientific
experience outside the courtroom. They may have different views about specific
instances of conflicting scientific testimony in a courtroom.155

Clearly, when science can say with certainty that a condition has not
been factually caused by a workplace, a workers’ compensation claimant
will probably not be able to successfully argue to the contrary. In the absence
of such certainty, however, where science does not clearly understand the
etiology of a disease, a workers’ compensation adjudicator possesses authority
to make reasonable inferences of causation.156 The relevance of this proposition
to COVID-19 is further discussed in the next Part; but to conclude this
Part, it is simply not true that workers’ compensation requires medical proof
of disease causation exceeding what is reasonable.

154.
155.
156.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2010).
Id.
See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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IV. COVID-19 CAUSATION UNDER TRADITIONAL
CAUSATION PRINCIPLES
A. Analysis
It was evident that during the pandemic the medical profession did not
fully understand the etiology of the disease.157 Experts initially instructed
people not to wear masks,158 and then changed their minds.159 During this
initial “no mask period” essential workers must have been exposed to elevated
risks of contracting the virus.160 Experts also initially believed that groceries
should be disinfected,161 but then changed their minds.162 The initial reaction
of some workers’ compensation commentators was somewhat predictably
that in the absence of definitive scientific proof of causation, workers’
compensation awards were likely unavailable.163 But, as explained above,
this level of certainty is unlikely to be obtainable in legal proceedings––
particularly in the initial chaos surrounding a pandemic––and it is not
necessary. 164 In light of the early inability to establish definitively
that COVID-19 disability was not work related, administrative factfinders
157. See Michelle A. Jorden et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19
Within the United States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 680, 682–83 (2020).
158. Darragh Roche, Fauci Said Masks ‘Not Really Effective in Keeping Out Virus,’
Email Reveals, NEWSWEEK (June 2, 2021, 4:59 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/faucisaid-masks-not-really-effective-keeping-out-virus-email-reveals-1596703 [https://perma.cc/
6YH2-SLFK] (chronicling history of vacillating advice on mask wearing).
159. CDC Calls on Americans to Wear Masks to Prevent COVID-19 Spread, CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 14, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/
2020/p0714-americans-to-wear-masks.html [https://perma.cc/LH4U-TMUB].
160. This is based on the assertion that COVID-19 is transmitted by, among other
ways, “inhalation of very fine respiratory droplets and aerosol particles,” and the lack of a
universal mask mandate at the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020 would have exposed
essential workers to higher risk of exposure. See generally SARS-CoV-2 Is Transmitted
by Exposure to Infectious Respiratory Fluids, CTR . DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(May 7, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/science-briefs/sarscov-2-transmission.html [https://perma.cc/K4PB-HHVB].
161. Leah Groth, Do You Have to Disinfect Groceries? Here’s What You Need to
Know About Shopping and Coronavirus, HEALTH (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.health.com/condition/
infectious-diseases/coronavirus/do-you-have-to-disinfect-groceries [https://perma.cc/
A5NN-XYCQ].
162. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Cleaning and Disinfecting Surfaces in NonHealth Care Settings, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 16, 2020), https://www.who.int/newsroom/q-a-detail/coronavirus-disease-covid-19-cleaning-and-disinfecting-surfaces-in-nonhealth-care-settings [https://perma.cc/DKU6-9RCF].
163. See, e.g., Allen Smith, Workers’ Compensation Won’t Cover Many Coronavirus
Claims, SOC. HUM. RES. MGMT. (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/
legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pages/workers-compensation-coronavirusclaims.aspx [https://perma.cc/4E2X-85EE].
164. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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would necessarily be forced to make reasonable inferences from casespecific medical opinions on factual causation.165 Certainty would be nearly
impossible. With respect to legal causation, the Larson’s treatise provides
an illuminating passage providing insight as to why COVID-19 is at least
classifiable as an occupational disease:
A disease which might otherwise be thought clearly nonoccupational may become
occupational because the employment facilitates its transmission. . . . Ordinarily
one would not think of tuberculosis as an occupational disease of telephone
operators; but if the enforced use of a close-fitting mouthpiece is an inherent part
of the job, and if it enhances the probability of transmission of the disease from
one operator to another, then apparently the distinctiveness of the mechanism of
transmission supplies all that is needed of occupational character. Although
practically all of the reported cases in this category have involved tuberculosis, it
might seem to follow that any disease, however unindustrial, could become an
occupational disease if there could be shown some method of transmission peculiar to
the employment. Thus, mumps might become an occupational disease of a deepsea diver whose diving helmet had been used by others, and gonorrhea might become
an occupational disease of lathe operators if they shared the use of protective
goggles.166

Or, one might easily add that COVID-19 could become an occupational
disease when meatpacking or nursing home employees are working at
close quarters with many other persons who likely have been infected with
COVID-19.167 Under this reasoning, COVID-19 should at a minimum not
have been conclusively presumed excluded from coverage unless a state
explicitly excludes all infectious diseases, or defines occupational diseases
narrowly and explicitly excludes any other disease from coverage. 168 If
nurses or other front-line employees were regularly in contact with persons
infected with the coronavirus, a “method of transmission peculiar to the
employment” is demonstrated.169 The same showing should be possible
with respect to any category of worker necessarily exposed to COVID-19,

165. See Timothy Zix et al., COVID-19 and Workers’ Compensation: Questions of
Causation and Compensability, TAFT L. (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.taftlaw.com/newsevents/law-bulletins/covid-19-and-workers-compensation-questions-of-causation-andcompensability [https://perma.cc/6BNG-82Y9].
166. 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 52.04.
167. See supra note 16 (discussing the vast spread of COVID-19 amongst meat and
poultry workers).
168. 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 52.04 (“Under occupational disease schedules, there
is relatively little occasion for judicial interpretation of the extent of coverage . . . .”).
169. See id.
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whether or not designated as “essential” by state authorities.170 Of course,
even if COVID-19 were designated an occupational disease, employees
would still have to make out their individual cases under applicable workers’
compensation causation standards, and that showing might have been
difficult unless states applied the positional risk test.
As discussed in the introduction of this Article, employees in some states
appeared to be experiencing blanket workers’ compensation case denials
during the pandemic.171 The Minnesota news story discussed at the outset172
will benefit from some additional context. An abstract of a study of
contemporary Minnesota-specific COVID-19 occupational data reads:
Coronavirus disease has disproportionately affected persons in congregate settings
and high-density workplaces. To determine more about the transmission patterns
of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in these settings,
we performed whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis on 319
(14.4%) samples from 2,222 SARS-CoV-2-positive persons associated with
8 outbreaks in Minnesota, USA, during March-June 2020. Sequencing indicated
that virus spread in 3 long-term care facilities and 2 correctional facilities was associated
with a single genetic sequence and that in a fourth long-term care facility, outbreak
cases were associated with 2 distinct sequences. In contrast, cases associated with
outbreaks in 2 meat-processing plants were associated with multiple SARS-CoV2 sequences. These results suggest that a single introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into
a facility can result in a widespread outbreak. Early identification and cohorting
(segregating) of virus-positive persons in these settings, along with continued
vigilance with infection prevention and control measures, is imperative. 173

Given this hyper-infectious environment and the resulting high-risk
nature of meatpacking work, a zero percent “win” rate for workers’
compensation claims involving hundreds of meatpacking employees––in
comparison to the thirty-two percent win rate for other claims not covered
in Minnesota by a presumption 174––strongly suggests that appropriate
causation standards were not being applied in good faith.175 Regardless of
170. See generally Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Structural Discrimination in
COVID-19 Workplace Protections, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (May 29, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200522.280105/full/ [https://perma.cc/
4SLT-X29F] (“Workers, who are being asked to risk their health by working outside their
homes during the COVID-19 pandemic, need adequate hazard compensation, safe workplace
conditions, and personal protective equipment (PPE).”).
171. Weber, supra note 19.
172. See supra note 6.
173. Nicholas B. Lehnertz et al., Transmission Dynamics of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in High-Density Settings, Minnesota, USA, March–June 2020,
27 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2052, 2052 (2021).
174. See supra note 6.
175. Public commentary often fails to distinguish between an employer’s preliminary
refusal to “accept” a claim and an administrative or governmental unit’s “denial” of a
claim. Few COVID-related workers’ compensation cases have been reported at this early
date, making a meta-analysis of ultimate win rates of COVID-related claims unfeasible.
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the precise mechanism of disease transmission, it seems extremely unlikely
that the risk of persons employed in meatpacking plants contracting
COVID-19 did not exceed the risk of persons in the general public of
contracting the disease. In other words, while workers’ compensation may
cover neutral risks in certain circumstances, it has historically covered
increased risks in most cases.176
In tort, courts have frequently adopted probabilistic theories of liability
where “some group of plaintiffs very likely have been injured by a defendant’s
activity but cannot prove which individuals were harmed because of lack
of specific causal proof.”177 In workers’ compensation, on the other hand,
elevated risk coupled with probabilistic medical opinion in a particular
case obviates the need for such exacting proof determinations.178 As already
discussed, however,179 a threshold problem is to determine whether COVID19 is an occupational or “other” disease and, if the latter, whether the other
disease is excluded under a state statute. 180 Occupational diseases are
compensable if the governing risk standard has been satisfied.181
Aside from this general analysis, it must also be noted that with respect
to prior cases addressing coverage of “contagion,” “the majority of cases
demand[] a showing of increased exposure to contagion.”182 Yet, as Larson’s
explains, in such cases “[t]he comparison is evidently made with a selected
group, a community that already is in the grip of the epidemic, and that
claimant visited only because of the employment.”183 This observation is
relevant to situations surrounding COVID-19. While the general public
It is conceivable that employers denied every COVID-19 claim but that the claims were
awarded later in the administrative process but there is no evidence to suggest it. To a sick
employee of limited financial means, such a delay would in any event amount to painful
“justice denied.”
176. While Minnesota law provides broad, increased-risk coverage of occupational
disease without a limiting schedule, it excludes “ordinary diseases of life.” MINN. STAT.
§ 176.011(15) (2021). However, the exclusion is vague because it does not apply “where
the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease, or where the exposure peculiar to
the occupation makes the disease an occupational disease hazard.” Id. In any event, COVID
could hardly be regarded as “ordinary.”
177. Betsy J. Grey, Causal Proof in the Pandemic, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE
124, 138 (2020).
178. See supra Part III.C.
179. See supra Part IV.A.
180. See supra Part IV.A.
181. See MINN. STAT. § 176.011(15)(a) (2021).
182. 1 LARSON, supra note 38, § 5.05 (citing LaTourette v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 682 (1997), aff’d, 941 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1997)).
183. Id.
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might be exposed to COVID-19 in the same manner as an employee in
the workplace, there are at least two already mentioned ways in which
employees’ risks of contracting COVID-19 were increased. First, during
widespread lockdowns an employee required to report to work in-person
experiences risk of contracting COVID-19 exceeding that of the general
public. Second, certain high-density workplaces obviously would seem
to increase an employee’s risk of contracting COVID-19 above that of the
general public. In the words of the Larson’s treatise, “[s]everal cases have
allowed recovery on the ‘preponderance of probabilities,’ when the place
of work was attended with a much higher proportionate risk of infection;
and by the same showing, of course, the requirement of increased risk for
purposes of the ‘arising’ test was satisfied.”184 Of course, as has been developed,
a state might decide to cover the neutral risks of contracting COVID-19.
But increased risk scenarios during a lockdown should not even have been
questionable. Once reasonable factual causation was established these
employees should have been covered.
B. Implications
Getting coverage of COVID-19 “right” as a nation matters. Workers’
compensation was, itself, an innovation made necessary by the national
emergency of industrial death and injury. 185 It would not do then, as it
does not suffice now, to argue that the legal system cannot be modified
because that is just not the way things are supposed to be. But in this
instance the system was flexible enough to have accommodated COVID19, popular din to the contrary notwithstanding. Ongoing thinking about

184. Id. This treatise lists several cases that discuss recovery on the preponderance
of probabilities when a plaintiff’s increased risk of infection arises out of work-related
duties. See, e.g., Roe v. Boise Grocery Co., 21 P.2d 910, 911–14 (Idaho 1933) (finding
that plaintiff could recover after showing a probability that he contracted Rocky Mountain
spotted fever when he was completing work-related activities); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Indus. Accident Comm’n, 258 P. 698, 699 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927) (finding plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence that his work-related duties caused his typhoid fever); Lothrop v.
Hamilton Wright Orgs., Inc., 356 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (1974) (finding substantial support
that the deceased’s viral hepatitis infection arose from his working conditions); Engels
Copper Mining Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 192 P. 845, 845 (Cal. 1920) (finding plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence showing his work-related duties caused his influenza); Sacred
Heart Med. Ctr. v. Carrado, 600 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Wash. 1979), rev’g 579 P.2d 412 (1978)
(finding petitioner showed a greater probability that he contracted hepatitis through his
employment); Smith v. Cap. Region Med. Ctr., 412 S.W.3d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
(finding claimant established a probability that his working conditions caused his influenza).
185. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 2–3 (2004) (describing the
unprecedented frequency and intensity of work injuries and death in the years leading up
to the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes).
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the coverage limitations of workers’ compensation during a pandemic
may well be required, for experts have cautioned:
Evidence suggests that SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 are only the latest examples of
a deadly barrage of coming coronavirus and other emergences. The COVID-19
pandemic is yet another reminder, added to the rapidly growing archive of historical
reminders, that in a human-dominated world, in which our human activities represent
aggressive, damaging, and unbalanced interactions with nature, we will increasingly
provoke new disease emergences. We remain at risk for the foreseeable future.
COVID-19 is among the most vivid wake-up calls in over a century. It should force
us to begin to think in earnest and collectively about living in more thoughtful
and creative harmony with nature, even as we plan for nature’s inevitable, and
always unexpected, surprises.186

Despite what has been said above, it must be acknowledged that, even
where occupational disease claims are formally covered by workers’
compensation, they are very rarely paid.187 In a 2004 article, J. Paul Leigh
and John A. Robbins showed that it is probable that between ninety-one
and ninety-nine percent of valid workers’ compensation disease claims are
never paid.188 It is simple: States do not want to pay for disease claims.189
Through aggressive litigation this may be adjustable, but it also may be
unrealistic to assume that the elderly and sick victims of long-latency diseases
could relentlessly pursue workers’ compensation claims, or even more
creative legal actions.190 State claim nullification, whether in the form of
disease exclusions, claim denials, or erection of legal and administrative
barriers to claim processing,191 suggests the need for long term reform of

186. David M. Morens & Anthony S. Fauci, Emerging Pandemic Diseases: How We
Got to COVID-19, 182 CELL 1077, 1089 (2020).
187. See Spieler, supra note 38, at 996 (“[O]ccupational disease claims are rarely
filed and often not compensated once they are filed.”).
188. J. Paul Leigh & John A. Robbins, Occupational Disease and Workers’ Compensation:
Coverage, Costs, and Consequences, 82 MILBANK Q. 689, 709 (2004).
189. See Spieler, supra note 38, at 991–98 (describing various state statutory provisions
that act as barriers to payment of occupational disease claims).
190. See Jamie Smith Hopkins, Worked to Death: How Victims Are Shut Out of the
Workers’ Comp System by Big Bills, Bad Laws, and Companies That Will Do Anything
but Pay, SLATE (Nov. 5, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
politics/2015/11/workers_comp_is_failing_to_pay_victims_of_occupational_disease_center
_for.html [https://perma.cc/P8ZV-FU62] (describing the financial burden incurred by a
workers’ compensation claimant while awaiting reimbursement of medical expenses post
litigation).
191. See generally Emily A. Spieler & John F. Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence
Between Work-Related Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 55 AM.
J. INDUS. MED. 487, 488, 495 (2012).
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disease coverage. Perhaps expanded federal, social insurance coverage of
disease disability, as in the black lung programs, is warranted.192 More
ambitiously, perhaps it is time to create a general federal short-term disability
program. Disease coverage problems will likely exit the public radar once
the furor surrounding COVID has abated, hampering continued policy
debate of the issue; but as a matter of constitutional law, nullification of workers’
compensation claims should allow for the availability of tort actions. 193
Perhaps an intermediate solution is possible. Negligence actions could
perhaps be allowed for workplace disease claims, with employee damages
being tethered to proportional causation: Thus, an employer who could be
proven twenty-percent responsible for an employee’s disease disability
would be responsible for twenty-percent of the employee’s damages.194
Such a model could potentially put some compensation in the hands of
victims who may otherwise be abandoned.
V. CONCLUSION
COVID-19 first laid bare that even where disease could be covered by
workers’ compensation, without offending its existing doctrine or theory,
early reports revealed that it often was not covered.195 This may be felicitous
news to employers and their insurance carriers prompting celebration of
much lower than expected workers’ compensations costs during the
pandemic.196 Many states seemed simply to have declined to cover workers
in the midst of a national emergency.197 That is certainly one way to lower
costs. But that leads to a second matter that COVID-19 laid bare. The United
States simply does not have a national short-term disability safety net to
protect people during periods of unavoidable misfortune. 198 This is
scandalous, and the gap was on full display for at least eighteen months.199
Furthermore, the workers’ compensation system made few friends among
the victims of this calamity. Normally, work-related diseases transpire
over time, in slow motion, and their waxing is hard to detect from day to
192. See Grey, supra note 177, at 146 (noting that workers facing “prolonged periods
of exposure in risky environments” should be permitted to use a federal compensation
system).
193. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
194. See Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 881–87 (proposing that courts determine causation
under a proportionality rule).
195. See supra Part I.
196. Angela Childers, COVID-19 Comp Claims Far Less than Anticipated, BUS. INS.
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20210203/NEWS06/912339
532/COVID-19-comp-claims-far-less-than-anticipated [https://perma.cc/3RJF-M9VQ].
197. See supra Part I.
198. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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day.200 Workers may remain unaware of what is happening to their bodies
as a result of work. When the system denies them compensation for this
type of disease, employees may not agree but at least understand the
problem of passage of time. Contraction of disease during a pandemic is
quite different. Every worker sees the emergence of both disease and
disability. Every worker knows, as a matter of common sense, that working
in the pandemic’s midst increased the risk of being infected. “But for”
the work, workers might believe, they would not have contracted the
disease—despite what an “expert” might say. A benefit system frustrating
coverage in such a situation can anticipate future bad feelings from the
affected public. On top of all of this, when some states simultaneously
cloaked employers with blanket tort immunity, all avenues to legal recourse
for workers were cut off as a practical matter.201 For those thinking that
the mean streets have recently become meaner, the very next thought might
be that it could have something to do with abandoning people during a
pandemic.
Workers’ compensation under coverage is unnecessary. In future pandemics–
– or in unforeseeable futuristic events––workers’ compensation stakeholders
can ensure principled workers’ compensation coverage of disability by
applying the positional risk rule of legal causation;202 and by upholding
common sense, probabilistic medical causation standards even if not dressed
in the garb of “certainty.”203 It is unclear whether COVID-19 is “over.”204
But whether it is over or not, the issue of coverage of short-term disability
produced by environmentally-heightened, but neutral risks is likely to be
a continuing feature of the modern workplace. Workers’ compensation
writ large will have to determine whether it wishes in this context to pave
a road to transformation or irrelevance.205

200. See 4 LARSON, supra note 38, § 53.03 (discussing legal problems created by the
long latency periods of certain diseases).
201. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part III.A.
203. See supra Part III.B.
204. See Stein, supra note 1.
205. See Mark Powell, Study: Higher Temperatures Lead to More Workplace Injuries,
Inside and Outside, WORKCOMPCENTRAL (July 10, 2021), https://ww3.workcomp central.
com/news/story/id/c56f5ec49531964c732e82e73b7b3a7ab90ab151 [https://perma.cc/
FN2F-JEU4]; see also Michael C. Duff, Can Workers’ Compensation “Work” in a Mega-Risk
World?: The COVID-19 Experiment, 35 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 17, 21 (2021).
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